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calling the Army and Navy to assist police with law and order. After six years the Mexican cartels still threaten U.S. interests and remain a national security threat to the United States. The U.S. and Mexico are inextricably linked economically, geographically, and culturally and threats to U.S. interests posed by the cartels require focused attention. While significant spill-over violence has not yet reached the U.S., the cartels have expanded operations in the U.S. and their brutal violent acts in Mexico impact U.S. interests. This paper argues that the war on drugs in Mexico has been a failure and that a new approach is needed. The United States and Mexico must continue to work together in order to diminish the levels of violence within Mexico, prevent spillover violence into the United States, and diminish the influence of the cartels . Finally, this paper will recommend changes to the current strategy to achieve those ends.
Mexican Cartels: Threat and Response
No country in the world affects daily life in the United States more than Mexico. The two countries are deeply intertwined, and what happens on one side of the border necessarily has consequences on the other side.
-Andrew Selee
In December 2006, Mexico's newly inaugurated President Felipe Calderon began an all-out offensive against Mexico's transnational drug cartels, eventually calling the Army and Navy into the streets to assist local and national police with law and order.
The almost daily revelations of brutal mutilations 1 , beheadings, torture, public hanging of corpses, assassination of government leaders and journalists, and wanton killing of innocent civilians by cartel members have captured the attention of U.S. security specialists and policy makers. After six years, a death toll exceeding 60,000 Mexican citizens, and violence unabated, the cartels in Mexico remain a national security threat to the United States (U.S.) given the many U.S. national interests affected, the close affinity and connection between the two nations, and the extensive proliferation and embedding of the cartel networks across the U.S. and abroad.
The United States, at the request of Mexico, has been an active partner in assisting its southern neighbor disrupt the cartels and stem the flow of illicit drugs northward into the U.S. This shared problem is driven by $39 billion 2 in U.S.
consumption of illegal drugs, most of which is handled at some point by Mexican cartels. Further, the violence has been partly fueled by the trafficking of arms from the U.S. into the hands of cartels for use against Mexican citizens. The consequences on both sides of the border are different, but the desire and need to stem the violence and 2 weaken the cartels is of paramount importance to policy-makers in both Washington . Important to the future between the two countries is the rising labor wages in China which is making Mexico more attractive to U.S. business.
Lower labor wages when combined with "geographic proximity to one of the largest consumer markets in the world, economic and political stability, ability to provide just-intime sourcing and a relatively transparent regulatory framework in which to do business" 7 , may create an trade environment where "Hecho en México" could be as commonplace on U.S. consumer goods in the future as "Made in China" is today 8 .
Indications suggest the two nations will be bound even closer economically and by 2018
Mexico may export more to the U.S. than any other country if current trends continue 9 .
Mexico, with a population over 100 million, and the U.S. Hispanic population expected to reach 30% by 2050 10 , Mexico as an ally and friend will not only be economically, but culturally important (currently, some 33 million persons, 10% of the U.S. population is of Mexican descent). While both countries are inextricably bound and mutually dependent, the relationship between the two has been "asymmetrical" where, . But this imbalance in the historical relationship has been gradually changing where both countries increasingly see one another as strategic partners 12 able to tackle a myriad of common issues, not least of which is in the security environment and specifically, the drug trade and the cartels supplying it.
This paper argues that by any appreciable measure the war on drugs in Mexico, as it has played out over the past six years, has been a failure and that a new approach is warranted. To this end, the United States and Mexico must continue to work in close partnership to begin to greatly diminish the levels of violence within Mexico, prevent spillover violence into the United States, while at the same time diminishing the influence of the cartels 13 . Therefore, this paper will recommend changes in the current strategy to achieve those ends.
The Situation
Significant rates of violence emanating from the estimated $39 billion Mexican drug enterprise has not yet reached the United States. However, the increasing economic and cultural interconnectedness between the U.S. and Mexico assures that the destabilizing and debilitating effects of the violence can and will impact U.S. national security and other U.S. national interests.
The geographic connectedness and a highly traversed international border have increased economic, social, political, and security interests between the U.S. and
Mexico and positively affected the populations on both sides of the border. However, because the cartels share many similarities with insurgent and terrorist groups does not make them akin to one another. They are in fact very violent and exceedingly well organized and adaptive transnational violent entrepreneurs all of whose "raison d'être is criminal activity for revenue generation." 18 As Kan opines, "unlike terrorists and insurgents, the cartels in Mexico are not motivated to create a homeland to call their own, substitute their ideology for an existing one, or achieve any political goal routinely associated with armed groups that instigate social upheaval." Nor is Mexico a failed state as some have alluded. Some elements of Mexican power have been extended to the breaking point -local and national police, for instance 6 -thus the call for soldiers and marines to augment security. Further, the cartels "control" over territory is largely in sparsely-inhabited rural areas, but they also operate quite effectively, like most organized criminal groups, in densely packed urban areas right under the nose of state authority. In either milieu, when the Mexican leadership opted to retake "lost" territory, they did so with relative ease because the cartels are not battling for physical terrain to occupy and hold. Also in contrast to insurgents and terrorists whose every action and word spoken is political and an engagement against the government and established authority. Further, formal Mexican government announcements of victory or improved security in a given area would normally be contested through the spoken or written word or met with increased attacks to demonstrate to the people the government is in fact not "winning". The cartels, driven by business and profit, tend to view government proclamations of "winning" generally as mostly irrelevant if they can go about their business less molested by the authorities.
It is important to put Mexico's violence in perspective. , suggest law enforcement is seizing cash in sums hardly noticeable by the cartels in the aggregate and act more as a nuisance than having any significant impact on profits.
Impacts on US Interests in Mexico
With the bulk of the violence south of the U.S. border, it is not surprising that U.S. The cartels have also been renowned for their ability to corrupt and infiltrate to very high levels of government and its institutions. In a noteworthy example, one cartel was able to place a mole inside the U.S. Embassy at its Interpol desk to extract and provide intelligence related to counter drug operations until he was finally discovered In order to prevent a rival cartel from completely filling the vacuum left by Los
Zetas, the Mexican government should develop a comprehensive full-spectrum highintensity policing strategy and capability to flood the new security environment to prevent a complete takeover of the area by just another cartel. President Nieto could then pivot and turn his attention to the next most violent cartel.
Full-Spectrum High-Intensity Policing
Police reform should be at the heart of any new strategy, but it must come in the form of a comprehensive and full-spectrum policing/law enforcement reform from national to local levels by creating an interlocking and layered approach to security.
After nearly six years of Mexican soldiers and marines in the streets, not surprisingly a 14 military primacy strategy has failed to lower the violence and curtail the freedom of action on the part of the cartels. The military has a key role to play in combating the cartels but the military should play a supporting role to law enforcement in lowering cartel violence.
What Mexico needs is full-spectrum high-intensity policing in order to help
Mexico City "create legitimate and effective government" which "can deliver essential services, including the rule of law" 53 , throughout the country focused on providing security to the citizenry. President Nieto's decision to create a new national police force 54 of up to 10,000 officers along the lines of France's National Gendarmerie, with military training but with police duties could be a big step in the right direction. His plan to deploy this Gendarmería Nacional to the most violent regions will provide a sorely needed capability gap between local and state police and deployed military forces, none of which are ideally suited to handle and operate in this complex multidimensional conflict. However, this plan is going to take years to fully implement, will likely have interoperability issues with local, state, and national police as well as other federal entities, and there are also likely to be police "rivalries" towards this new elite unit which will diminish its effectiveness and the effectiveness of the entire security team.
A paramilitary force mirroring the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri can only be part of the overall solution and is no single panacea for the security situation.
Mexico must rebuild its local and state police forces while simultaneously it develops a new Gendarmería Nacional so that all can effectively operate together. Local police as part of this initiative will need to be the key contribution to this effort. However, this "core policing" as "an enhancer both to legitimacy and law enforcement effectiveness" Despite a desire to get the troops back in the barracks, the Mexican military will need to remain in place for the foreseeable future, until the Gendarmería Nacional is fully operational, as the primary means to offensively engage the cartels. As security increases and violence abates in areas, newly trained local police can fill the improved security environment and hopefully rapidly gain the support of the local populace 16 through their demonstrated professionalism with a focus on the needs of the populace.
As the people begin to see a more robust, competent and capable local police they will help improve the overall public safety by cooperating with police. It is these local police who are the key to the future of Mexican security.
Criminal Justice Reform
In order for full-spectrum high-intensity policing to work and have the intended In situations where the development of courts and prisons is insufficient or nonexistent and secure facilities in which to hold and try criminals are lacking, police face the invidious choice of punishing the miscreants themselves or letting them go. Either choice will demoralize and corrupt even the best-trained police force, severely undermine public confidence, and hobble efforts to establish democratic governance 59 .
In a milieu such as exists where criminals, and even murderers, are released and largely go unpunished after police have risked their lives, not even a new Gendarmería Nacional will make much of an impact, even if supremely led and trained. Without the support of a more responsive court system which can actually convict and imprison
Mexico's worst offenders, the new Gendarmería will be severely hobbled.
Counterintelligence
Central to Mexico's policing problem is the penetration of high level institutions and law enforcement by the cartels. Preventing infiltration into a new elite Gendarmería Nacional paramilitary force by the cartels will be paramount or the organization will be rendered ineffective even before it is employed. As Ken Casas-Zamora notes "Mexico's problem is not territorial control, but the penetration of public institutions --particularly law enforcement institutions--by organized crime. This is a problem that cannot be solved by any military contingent, no matter how large, committed, or effective. It requires instead nothing short of rebuilding law enforcement institutions and intelligence agencies" 60 . Developing an aggressive and effective counterintelligence capability backed by a robust legal system is sorely needed in Mexico.
This enduring counterintelligence emphasis would go a long way to ensuring law enforcement and other institutions are screened and routinely assessed and purged of cartel penetration, corruption, and control. Over the long run, not only will public confidence return, but so would trust between police, military, and intelligence organizations who have deep distrust in one another due to corruption and infiltration.
This distrust manifests itself in poor communications, a lack of willingness to coordinate mutual support until the last minute, and generally an unwillingness to share information and intelligence which would be beneficial towards unity of effort. The Army (SEDENA) and Navy (SEMAR), since being called into the streets rarely operate together.
SEMAR, which is proud to boast that it has not yet had an officer implicated with the cartels, is highly suspicious of SEDENA where several high ranking officers have been accused of collusion with the various cartels and from whose Special Forces ranks the Los Zetas were formed. Through an aggressive and effective vetting process at all levels utilizing background checks, routine use of polygraphs, and an active counterintelligence investigation unit Mexico would have an effective shield against the cartels and develop trust amongst various entities critical to fighting the cartels and lessening the violence.
Conclusion
In order to begin reducing violence to an acceptable level, a Zeta-first strategy will be the quickest way to achieve this end by applying scarce resources on the greatest threat to the state and focusing on a more narrow problem set. In order to accomplish this, Mexico will need to develop a comprehensive full-spectrum highintensity policing capability integrating complementary capabilities from the national to the local level to take back the streets from the cartels. Directly supporting this, Mexico must concurrently reform its criminal justice system to ensure that violent offenders, when tried and convicted, are put behind bars and no longer menace Mexican society.
Finally, an aggressive counterintelligence effort aimed at identifying and impeding penetration of key institutions by the cartels will improve operational success and regain the initiative in the Mexican government's favor. These recommendations are not exhaustive. Other elements of a more comprehensive strategy would include: quickly shifting the military to a supporting role as a direct action force against the cartels; allow intelligence to drive operations; fighting transnational violent entrepreneur networks with
